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SYMPOSIUM: GENDER ISSUES
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
FOREWORD: THE MEANING OF GENDER
EQUALITY IN CRIMINAL LAW
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS*
This Symposium reflects a growing interest in the criminal law's
treatment of women, both as victims and as offenders. Feminist legal
analyses of crime have concentrated on men's violence against wo-
men, perhaps because it so directly imposes patriarchal power.1 Femi-
nists have challenged the male perspective that structured the
definition of rape and discounted the harm of domestic violence.
Now feminist legal scholars are examining the punishment of female
lawbreakers as another site of gender inequality. This interest in crim-
inal law makes sense. Although the law generally compels and legiti-
mates prevailing relationships of power, the criminal law most directly
mandates socially acceptable behavior. Criminal law also helps to
shape the way we perceive women's proper role. The articles
presented in this Symposium explore a spectrum of issues raised by
this inquiry into gender and criminal law. Michelle Oberman's arti-
cle, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law,
reconsiders statutory rape laws in light of current evidence that ado-
lescent girls are especially vulnerable to male sexual aggression. 2
Deborah W. Denno's article, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law De-
fenses, studies the reasons for gender disparities in the commission of
crime and considers the consequences for women's culpability for
* Fellow, Program in Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University;, Professor,
Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. BA 1977, Yale College;J.D. 1980, Harvard Law
School.
1 Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 Jusr. Q. 497, 513
(1988).
2 Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law Reform, 85 J. Caim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1994).
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their criminal conduct.3 Finally, in The Role of Gender in a Structured
Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of
Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Ilene H.
Nagel and Barry L. Johnson challenge claims that the recent adoption
of gender-neutral sentencing guidelines actually treats women
unfairly.4
Each of the articles explores the meaning of gender equality in
criminal law and wrestles with difficult issues, such as whether gender
equality requires protecting teenage girls from sexual coercion
through enforcement of statutory rape laws, or respecting their sexual
choices by abolishing these laws; whether gender equality requires ac-
knowledging the biological differences that influence women's crimi-
nality, or ignoring them; and whether gender equality requires
preferential treatment of female offenders based on their family re-
sponsibilities, or gender neutral sentencing that imposes the same
penalties on men and women. As these articles illustrate, the com-
plexity of these inquiries often lead to opposite conclusions.
Figuring out the answers might invoke the now familiar same-
ness/difference debate. Feminist theorizing has grappled with
describing the nature of differences between men and women and
identifying the relationship of these differences to gender equality.5
According to this framework, the "difference" approach emphasizes
gender disparities and advocates different treatment (sometimes
called special protection) for women. The "sameness" approach mini-
mizes the differences between the sexes and advocates the same treat-
ment for men and women based on gender neutrality. Proponents of
the "sameness" approach fear that acknowledging gender differences
in power or biology perpetuates negative female stereotypes and
roles.6 Feminists who challenge the male bias in criminal law risk sim-
ilar charges of special treatment of both victims and offenders. Defin-
ing gender equality as "similar treatment" causes people to perceive
some efforts to protect women from sexual coercion as paternalism.
3 Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CruM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 80 (1994).
4 Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System:
Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181 (1994).
5 See generally THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SExuAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 1990); Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1043
(1987). Other feminist scholars reject the enterprise of "grand theory" altogether and
suggest instead the need for a more contextual analysis of gender equality. See, e.g.,
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1181, 1181 (1994); Katharine
T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 884 (1990).
6 See, e.g., Wendy M. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982).
[Vol. 85
FOREWORD
This definition of equality also sees paternalism in efforts to recognize
criminal women's distinct situations in determining their culpability
or punishment.
Other feminists demonstrated that the very framing of the equal-
ity inquiry in terms of sameness and difference ignored an underlying
male standard, as well as the systemic subordination of women.7 They
reconceived gender equality as a question of the distribution of
power, rather than the differences between the sexes. Thus, the path
to gender equality does not lie in either ignoring or glorifying innate
differences between men and women. It lies in eradicating society's
use of gender differences to keep women in an inferior political sta-
tus. As Ann Scales observed, "[i]njustice does not flow directly from
recognizing differences; injustice results when those differences are
transformed into social and economic deprivation.", Understanding
the mechanisms of injustice requires attention to the operation of the
law within the context of particular social circumstances.9
Feminists examining criminal law should be concerned with un-
covering the ways that the criminal law contributes to women's depri-
vation by continuing to reflect and protect patriarchal interests.
Feminist scholars should use these discoveries to devise ways to trans-
form criminal law into a more egalitarian system that respects all wo-
men as self-determining human beings. The ultimate goal is not
simply to remove the aspects that disadvantage women, but to de-
scribe a feminist vision of criminal justice. Of course, feminists will
forever struggle over the best course to take. It is essential, however,
to acknowledge the power differences between men and women and
then work to eliminate them. As Fran Olsen puts it, it is pointless "to
pretend that men and women are similarly situated."10 How readers
perceive the proposals presented in this Symposium for achieving
gender equality in criminal law will depend largely on the degree of
pretense in which they are willing to engage.
Two additional features are critical to the feminist pursuit of gen-
der equality in criminal law. First, it must recognize that race and
class shape women's confrontation with criminal law as much as gen-
der. Race and class help to determine the criminal law's treatment of
female victims of crime. For example, the social meaning of rape in
7 See, e.g., CATHARNE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMrNIsM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON Lim AND LAw 32 (1987); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist
Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373 (1986).
8 Scales, supra note 7, at 1396.
9 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 1181.
10 Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Thx. L. REv.
387, 412 (1984).
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America has centered on a mythology that defines Black women as
sexual objects." White men's sexual exploitation of Black women
during and after slavery was an instrument of white supremacy, as well
as male domination.1 2 Further, the criminal law has enforced the ra-
cial meaning of rape by denying rape's injury to Black women. Angela
Harris concluded about the history of rape law, "as a legal matter, the
experience of rape did not even exist for black women."' 3 Contempo-
rary American juries and law enforcement officials continue to dis-
count the stories of Black victims of sexual assault.14
Race and class also influence the criminal law's treatment of fe-
male lawbreakers. The punishment of criminal mothers, for example,
reflects society's differentiation of mothers based on race and class.15
Prosecutions of drug use during pregnancy target poor, Black women
because these women are subject to greater government supervision
and fail to meet the white middle-class ideal of motherhood. 16 Femi-
nist scholars should explore the relationship between racism, class
bias, and patriarchy in the criminal law's subordination of women.
Achieving gender equality in criminal law requires eliminating racism
and class bias from criminal law.
Second, feminists should do more than simply reveal discrimina-
tion against or preferential treatment towards women in the govern-
ment's enforcement of criminal laws. They should also reveal the
inequality that is embedded in the very definition of crime-an ine-
quality which reinforces prevailing relationships of power."7 Laws
criminalizing maternal conduct, for example, help to shape the very
11 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 176-79 (1990); Karen A. Getman, Sexual Control in the
Slaveholding South: The Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HA.v. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 115, 142 (1984);Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 103, 122 (1983).
12 COLLINS, supra note 11, at 177-78; ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, & CLASS 23, 24
(1981); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN 33-36 (1981).
13 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581,
600 (1990).
14 See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467,
1470 (1992); Barbara Omolade, Black Women, Black Men and Tawana Brawley-The Shared
Condition, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 11, 16 (1989); Wriggins, supra note 11, at 122.
15 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. R v. 95, 103-09 (1993)
[hereinafter Motherhood and Crime].
16 Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1454-55 (1991) [hereinafter PunishingDrug
Addicts].
17 See generally CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989) (exploring how
law, particularly criminal law, enforces an account of social reality); Richard C. Boldt, The
Construction of Responsibility in Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245 (1992) (discussing how
the criminal law creates and maintains a perspective on human behavior).
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meaning of motherhood.' 8 As noted, the prosecutions of poor, Black
crack addicts do more than enforce a neutral law in a discriminatory
fashion; they also devalue black motherhood. I observed elsewhere
that "prosecution of these pregnant women serves to degrade women
whom society views as undeserving to be mothers and to discourage
them from having children.... Society is much more willing to con-
done the punishment of poor women of color who fail to meet the
middle class ideal of motherhood." 19 In the same way, laws that pun-
ish mothers for failing to protect their children from another's abuse
often enforce a subordinating image of mothers as selfless beings.20
Courts often hold women responsible for harm to their children
based on their role as mother, rather than the particular circum-
stances of the violence.21 Thus, courts discipline these women even
though they are victims of the same violence as their children. These
examples show that achieving gender equality in criminal law requires
uprooting patriarchal views of women at many levels.
EQUALITY FOR FEMALE VIcrIMs OF CRIME
Feminists have made a dramatic contribution to rape law. They
have demonstrated that, historically, the law of rape has regulated
competing male interests in controlling sexual access to females, in-
stead of protecting women's interest in controlling their own bodies
and sexuality.2 2 Despite two decades of rape reform, however, the
criminal law still does not adequately protect female sexual autonomy.
Moreover, some feminist efforts to further expand society's percep-
tion of what constitutes rape-especially acquaintance rape-face
charges of perpetuating paternalistic stereotypes of female passivity.
Conservatives and feminists alike question the need for the criminal
law's special protection of women's agreements to engage in sexual
intercourse.28
18 See Michelle Oberman, The Control of Pregnancy and the Ciminalization of Femaleness, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1992); Roberts, Motherhood and Crime supra note 15, at 103; Rob-
erts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 16, at 1444. See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, The
Gender Question in Criminal Law, in CRIME, CULPABIuI.Y, AND REMEDY 105 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 1990) (discussing ways in which traditional criminal law doctrine reflects a
'male" conception of rights and responsibilities); Mary E. Odem, Fallen Women and Thieving
Ladies: Historical Approaches to Women and Crime in the United States, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
351 (1992) (book review) (discussing the legal history of the criminal punishment of wo-
men for inappropriate sexual behavior).
19 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 16, at 1435-36.
20 Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 15, at 109-19.
21 Id. at 110-13.
22 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMiLLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975);
SUSAN EsrRIcH, REAL RAPE (1987).
28 See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) (presenting a view of sex as a
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Michelle Oberman's critique of the decriminalization of statutory
rape grapples with this tension between the meaning of women's sex-
ual autonomy and the consequences of state protection. Oberman
demonstrates that laws regarding minors generally depend on norma-
tive decisions about minors' access to adult activities, not on an assess-
ment of minors' ability to make their own decisions.2 4 Rather than
respecting girls' sexual decisions and desires, the decriminalization of
statutory rape similarly reflects the expectation that girls sometimes
should be sexually accessible to males.
Oberman's analysis of the criminal law's failure to protect adoles-
cent girls relies on a critical observation about the meaning of con-
sent. A woman's consent to sex, like all legal choices, is a "social
construct."25 Judicial determinations of whether teenage girls freely
engaged in sex inevitably depend on normative judgments about the
permissibility of the male pressures they faced. Oberman argues that
protecting girls' sexual autonomy involves considering the precondi-
tions necessary for girls' meaningful consent to sexual activity. 26 This
task requires attending to the imbalance of power between adolescent
boys and girls and the disparate societal expectations regarding their
sexuality. Although it is tempting to pretend that girls are now sexu-
ally liberated, in reality our culture still conditions them to submit to
unwanted physical contact in order to please men. The challenge for
reform is to craft a law that recognizes girls' vulnerability without un-
fairly limiting their sexuality or unjustly punishing boys who engage in
mutually desired sexual relationships.
Oberman's article raises two additional problems with rape law.
First, judicial interpretations of rape statutes ignore a great deal of
violence in women's lives. Courts often require a showing of serious
physical injury in addition to the unpermitted sexual activity. They
fail to see the man's latent threat of violence or the violence in the
commodity to be traded on the market); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the
Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1791
(1992) (proposing another commodity theory of sex: "[t ]here is good reason to believe that
the inequality of women in sexual bargaining is less than their inequality in commercial
bargaining."); KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS
(1993) (criticizing "campus-rape-crisis feminists" for portraying women as intellectually in-
ferior to men).
24 Oberman, supra note 2, at 45-56.
25 Stephenj. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAw
& PHIL. 35, 41 (1992).
26 Oberman, supra note 2, at 74-82. Cf Schulhofer, supra note 25, at 1786-87 (propos-
ing an alternative model of rape law that replaces the traditional preoccupation with force
and nonconsent with a concern for the preconditions of women's meaningful choice in
sexual activities).
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coerced sexual activity itself.27 Many statutory rape cases involve so
much violence that prosecutors should not need to resort to a statu-
tory rape charge.28 Oberman points out that some girls participated
in the Spur Posse "game" of sexual exploits only because they were
afraid that the boys would beat them up if they did not cooperate. 29
In Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,30 in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld California's statutory rape law, the vic-
tim permitted the defendant to "do what he wanted" only after he
slugged her in the face several times.3' In Commonwealth v. Rhodes,32
the twenty-year-old defendant lured an eight-year-old girl from a play-
ground into a nearby abandoned building where he had sexual inter-
course with her. The trial judge held that the defendant's actions did
not constitute forcible rape, despite the girl's age and her pleas for
the defendant to stop, because there was no evidence of "forcible
compulsion."33 Because the law permits sexual coercion against girls,
prosecutors sometimes must rely on statutory rape laws to obtain a
conviction even where victims experience violence. The critique of
statutory rape laws should focus on challenging courts' persistent ac-
ceptance of some degree of violence against girls as a means of sexual
access, as well as on the debate over whether these laws are
paternalistic.
Second, the disparate enforcement of both statutory rape laws
and forcible rape laws demonstrates that categories of entitlement re-
flecting relationships of power in society determine the meaning of
rape.34 Juries decide whether a rape occurred by judging the man's
27 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. Ray.
359, 369-81 (1993).
28 Prosecutors would prefer to obtain a rape conviction since statutory rape is usually
punished less severely. In Pennsylvania, for example, rape is a first degree felony, while
statutory rape is a second degree felony. Compare 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3121 with 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3122.
29 Oberman, supra note 2, at 17 n.10.
30 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
31 Oberman, supra note 2, at 39 n.138.
32 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
33 Id. at 1220. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that "forcible compulsion" included moral, psychological or intellectual, as well as
physical, force. Id. In Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A2d 1335 (Pa. 1988), however,
the same court held that a foster father's threat to commit a fourteen-year-old girl to a
juvenile detention center if she did not submit to sexual intercourse did not constitute
forcible compulsion. The court reached this conclusion despite its finding that the girl
refused to have sex with the defendant until he threatened her and that she experienced
pain and "'scream [ed], holler[ed]' and cried" during the defendant's attempts to penetrate
her. Id. at 1337.
34 See Steven B. Katz, Expectation and Desire in the Law of Forcible Rape, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 21, 21-23 (1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence 8 SIGNS 635, 648 (1983); Roberts, supra note 27, at 361-68.
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entitlement to sexual access and the woman's entitlement to the law's
protection. These judgments of entitlement depend on race and
class, as well as gender.35 Statutory rape laws protect only chaste, vir-
tuous girls. 36 Determinations of which girls fit this category depend
on the girls' sexual history, and on racial and other sexual stereotypes.
Thus, the reason prosecutors felt that the victims of the Spur Posse's
sexual exploits did not deserve the statutory rape law's protection has
more to do with their presumption that these girls were licentious
than with what occurred between them and the gang members. As
with every other aspect of criminal law, statutory rape laws' favorable
treatment of females extends primarily to certain classes of females
who fit patriarchal standards for women. The real aim for achieving
gender equality is not eliminating such superficially preferential treat-
ment, but purging the deeper biases that value women based on ille-
gitimate hierarchies.
EQUALITY FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS
The most striking fact about female offending is its relative infre-
quency and lack of violence compared to male crimes.3 7 Deborah
Denno's article explores the reasons for this gender disparity and sug-
gests that the explanation accounts for the underlying causes of crime
in general. 38 Denno is especially interested in determining the inter-
play between biology, sociology, and environment in predicting crimi-
nal conduct, and in the gender differences in the relative importance
of these factors. Using the results of the Biosocial Study, she discovers
that, although factors predicting crime among males and females are
similar, biological factors are relatively stronger predictors of crime
among females. 39 Denno concludes that gender disparity in the envi-
ronmental and biological predictors of crime do not justify differen-
tial treatment unless independent, gender-neutral reasons would
support this result.
Denno's article also raises the more preliminary question of
whether studying biological predictions for criminal behavior is the
way to seek gender equality in criminal law. The answer is probably
that it is not. Feminism's greatest contribution to criminal law has
been to reveal its political nature. Feminists have demonstrated that
male violence against women is rooted in prevalent power relation-
35 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
36 Oberman, supra note 2, at 33-38.
37 See Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, Gender, Age, and Crime, in CRIMINOLOG. A
CONTEMPORARY HANDBOOK 67, 67-70 (Joseph F. Shaley ed., 1991).
38 Denno, supra note 3, at 86.
39 Id at 99-101.
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ships rather than in men's biological or mental aberrations. 40 Schol-
ars should extend this insight concerning male criminality to their
analyses of female lawbreaking. Feminists should analyze female
crimes within the context of patriarchal power. Biological explana-
tions of crime tend to do precisely the opposite. They divert attention
away from the political causes and meanings of crime.
Indeed, the powerful have historically attributed criminal con-
duct to irremediable biological causes in order tojustify their oppres-
sion of others. Biological explanations for crime depoliticize social
conflicts and make official restraint of disenfranchised groups seem
natural and inevitable. 41 American eugenic theory during the first
half of the twentieth century explained criminality as an inherited
trait.4 2 Legislatures implemented this theory in laws that mandated
sterilization or castration of habitual criminals. 43 History reveals, how-
ever, that these eugenic programs punished those who deviated from
social norms.44 In the same way, early biological explanations of fe-
male criminality enforced a normative view of women's role as passive
and asexual.45
Biological explanations for crime accept as unproblematic the
definition of crime and the identification of criminals. They focus
exclusively on why individuals acted in a way that society deems crimi-
nal, rather than considering why society defines their conduct as crim-
inal. For example, does the Biosocial Study's finding that twenty-two
percent of the black youth it tracked had at least one police contact
prior to age eighteen reveal a high incidence of delinquency in this
cohort or a high incidence of police harassment in their inner-city
neighborhood?46 Feminists should examine how the definition and
punishment of female crimes enforce subordinating views of women,
40 See, e.g., MAcKiNNoN, supra note 7, at 126-54, 171-83 (explaining rape's origin in
ordinary heterosexual relationships, which enforce male power and eroticize dominance);
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1, 5 (1991) (explaining domestic violence as "the batterer's quest for control of
the woman").
41 SeeJanet Katz & Charles F. Abel, The Medicalization of Repression: Eugenics and Crime, 8
CONTEMp. CRISES 227, 227 (1984).
42 See Nicole H. Rafter, Introduction to WHrrE TRASH: THE EUGENIC FAMILY STUDIES 1877-
1919 11 (Nicole H. Rafter ed., 1988).
43 SeeJeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Authorizing Asexualization or Sterili-
zation of Criminals orMentalDefectives, 53 A.L.R.3d 960, 963-65 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (striking as unconstitutional a state statute that provided for
the sterilization of certain habitual criminals).
44 Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. Rxv. 1945, 1963-64
(1993).
45 See Denno, supra note 3, at 86-92.
46 See Denno, supra note 3, at 104. Cf id at 99-103 (noting the differential treatment of
white and black juveniles charged with crimes).
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as well as why women break apparently neutral criminal laws.
Finally, biological explanations for crime often point to the
wrong solution for crime. They cast offenders as victims of a biologi-
cal fate, rather than agents acting in a social and political context.
Biological explanations for some crimes locate their cause in individ-
ual offenders' aberrational disorders, rather than in their imposition
of power. They lead to the conclusion that, for example, men who
batter manifest a problem with controlling their anger. Biological ex-
planations for other crimes perceive their cause as the offenders'
physical inability to cope with an oppressive environment. Under this
approach, the solution to the crimes is to punish or cure the offend-
ers' disability rather than seeking to change their oppressive environ-
ment.47 Explanations of maternal child abuse center on the failure of
maternal instinct or mothers' inability to cope with the stresses of
child rearing.48 They consequently fail to examine the connection be-
tween child abuse and power struggles in the home.49
Defenses based on women's illnesses, such as premenstrual syn-
drome and postpartum depression, also risk misdiagnosing the causes
of some women's crimes. Some women may suffer from medical con-
ditions extreme enough to negate volition or mitigate culpability.50
The criminal law should acknowledge illnesses that affect female de-
fendants' criminal responsibility as it has acknowledged male disabili-
ties. Americans have a tendency, however, to ascribe women's
47 In analyzing the causes of crime, it may be helpful to distinguish between externally-
created and internally-created biological disabilities. For example, there is a significant
difference between a neurological impairment caused by lead exposure that is linked to
criminal conduct and a genetic predisposition towards crime. See Deborah W. Denno, Con-
sidering Lead Poisoning As A Criminal Defense, 20 FoRDHAM UR. L.J. 377, 397 (1993). The
obvious solution to the former criminogenic factor--eradicating hazardous lead paint-is
far less problematic than the potential solutions for supposedly genetic traits. I am grateful
to Joyce McConnell for helping me to articulate this distinction.
48 See Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 15, at 110-11; Sarah Uhl, Stereotypes of
Women Cloud DrugDiscussion, N.Y. TiMas, Apr. 7, 1990, at A24 (letter) (criticizing claim that
crack use overwhelms maternal instinct).
49 See Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 15, at 126-30. Battered mothers are
much more likely to abuse their children than mothers who are not battered. Id. at 126,
n.156 (citing studies that demonstrate the connection between child abuse and woman
battering); Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Woman-Battering Child Abuse and Social Heredity:
What is the Relationship? in MARrrAL VIOLENCE 147, 165 (Norman Johnson ed., 1985) (refut-
ing the theory that abuse is transmitted intergenerationally; "To the contrary, the stimulus
to this history of deliberate injury and child abuse appears to be repeated assault by a male
intimate, not a personal or familial inheritance of pathology.").
50 See generally Linda R. Chait, Premenstrual Syndrome & Our Sisters in Crime: A Feminist
Dilemma, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 267, 293 (1986); Laura E. Reece, Mothers Who Kil" Postpar-
tumDisorders and CriminalInfanticide, 38 UCLA L. REv. 699,757 (1991) (arguing that "[n]ew
mothers who commit infanticide... not only should be able to introduce evidence of their
[postpartum] disorders in their defense, but should have their experience of postpartum
depression or postpartum psychosis considered as an exculpating factor.").
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problems to illnesses. 5 ' Defining ordinary female experiences, such
as menstruation, as pathological, has helped to justify women's
subordinate position as well as the widescale medical management of
women.
Female defendants may be forced to portray themselves as ill or
insane, because the law does not recognize the stifling social condi-
tions that contributed to their criminal acts. In many cases, female
defendants will argue that biological explanations, such as premen-
strual syndrome and postpartum depression, rather than the con-
straints of traditional female roles, caused them to commit the crime.
Perhaps Shirley Santos, the first American woman to raise a defense
based on premenstrual syndrome, hit her daughter in reaction to the
burdens of childrearing, and not because of any biological ailment;52
or mothers who argue that postpartum depression excuses them from
liability for infanticide killed their babies after experiencing the
stresses of singlehandedly caring for a newborn.5 3 Women's reliance
on these defenses reflects society's reluctance to address women's
problems unless they are explained as illnesses.5 4 Society is more will-
ing to cure women's diseases than to change women's social circum-
stances. The political, rather than organic, origins of maternal crimes
do not necessarily excuse mothers' violence. This political context,
however, calls into question traditional notions of culpability and ex-
cuse. It may be a more productive site than mothers' pathologies for
solving most maternal crimes.
Another issue is the meaning of gender equality in sentencing
offenders. Mitigating women's sentences based on family responsibili-
ties may be paternalistic and may perpetuate female stereotypes.
There is sound historical support for this concern. Until recently, a
woman's role in the family determined the criminal sentence a court
imposed upon her. Sentencing of female offenders evinced society's
image of women as mothers or potential mothers and enforced appro-
priate gender roles.5 5 Sociologist Kathleen Daly theorizes that the
treatment of offenders reflected a "familial justice" consisting of two
51 SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT 179-200 (1992) (discussing the "raging hor-
mones" myth as stereotypical of menstruating women but advocating a PMS/organic con-
dition defense in rare and extreme circumstances).
52 See Denno, supra note 3, at 158-601; People v. Santos, No. IK046299 (Kings County,
N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 3, 1982).
53 For example, Sheryl Massip, who was found not guilty of murder by reason of in-
sanity, became depressed when she was unable to comfort her crying newborn. Denno,
supra note 3, at 164 n.320; People v. Massip, 824 P.2d 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
54 SHERWIN, supra note 51, at 179-80.
55 Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 15, at 103-04. See also Nagel & Johnson,
supra note 4, at nn.27-33 (citing studies demonstrating that women offenders received pref-
erential treatment).
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factors: (1) informal social controls that work in place of formal in-
carceration, and (2) the social costs created by incarceration. 56
Judges treated women more leniently because they assumed women's
family responsibilities would provide informal social controls in their
lives and that women's caretaking was essential to children's welfare.5 7
On the other hand, gender equality may require taking gender
into account in sentencing because of incarceration's actual effect on
women. The lives of female offenders reflect the stark gender dispar-
ity in childcare that exists in the broader society. Few men in prison
are primary caretakers of children; most women in prison are primary
caretakers.58 Moreover, while the children of most male offenders
remain in the care of their mother, incarcerated mothers rarely can
rely on the father to care for their children. 59 Thus, it is far more
likely that the incarceration of a woman will disrupt her relationship
with her child. The gender disparity in childcare generally makes a
particular term of imprisonment more harsh of a penalty for women
than for men. Therefore, treating female offenders the same as male
offenders results in inequality in the actual consequences of
punishment.
In response to this disparate impact, Nagel and Johnson observe
that it is impossible to distinguish this "subjective" harm to mothers
from those claimed by other offenders, such as elderly prisoners with
few years to live or executives at the height of their careers. "Permit-
ting these intersubjective comparisons to alter the otherwise applica-
ble sentence leads to a free-for-all of sentence individualization, each
defendant arguing that her incarceration would be more painful than
that of other defendants." 60 The harsh impact of gender-neutral sen-
tencing on most female offenders, however, is distinctly invidious, be-
cause it results from the unequal social distribution of childcare.
56 Kathleen Daly, Discrimination in Criminal Courts: Family, Gender, and the Problem of
Equal Treatment, 66 Soc. FORCES 152, 154-55 (1987).
57 1d. at 168. Nagel and Johnson predict that recent state and federal reforms that
minimize judicial sentencing discretion will reduce this historical mitigation of female of-
fenders' sentences based on women's family roles. See Nagel &Johnson, supra note 4, at
216-20.
58 Myma S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing. Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-
Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REv.
905, 951-53 (1993).
59 See Donna C. Hale, Impact of Mothers' Incarceration on the Family System: Research and
Recommendations, 12 MARRIAGE & Fum. REv. 143, 149 (1988); George J. Church, The View
from Behind Bars, TIME, Fall 1990, at 20-21; Raeder, supra note 58, at 955. A 1991 federal
inmate survey, for example, revealed that 91% of men but only 33% of women reported
that their children currently live with the child's other parent. Raeder, supra note 58, at
952.
60 Nagel &Johnson, supra note 4, at 205.
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Moreover, the aim of eliminating preferential treatment for women
wrongly assumes that the sentencing system is basically fair. Uniform
sentencing is not fair, however, if embedded in sentencing schemes is
a male-based model that presumes a potentially violent criminal who
is not the primary caretaker of young children.61
Nor will acknowledging the gender-based nature of childcare
alone achieve gender equality. Judges who mitigate sentences based
on childcare responsibilities may incorporate biased images of moth-
erhood in their decisionmaking. Sentencing judges have not treated
leniently women who depart from the norm of ideal mother, such as
poor women, women of color, lesbians, single women, and women
who commit "unfeminine" crimes. 62 They have assumed that white,
middle-class mothers are both more amenable to nonjudicial social
controls and more crucial to their children's welfare. 63 To the con-
trary, mothers who are considered the most deviant-poor, unmar-
ried, minority mothers-may be most in need of reduced sentences
since their bonds with their children are most disrupted by their in-
carceration. Judges' difficulty in seeing this injury stems from devalu-
ation of the relationship between these women and their children.
Yet another aspect of modem sentencing guidelines results in es-
pecially harsh sentencing of female offenders. Tough, mandatory
minimum sentences for participation in drug trafficking conspiracies
often imprison women with minor roles in these conspiracies arising
from their intimate relationship with more culpable men. 64 These wo-
men may become involved in crime because of their financial depen-
dence on, or fear of, the men, as well as their romantic attachment to
them. Nagel and Johnson point out that some federal courts have
mitigated the sentences of women whose victimization influenced
their criminal conduct.65 Sentencingjudges see battered women who
are coerced by violent men to commit crimes as less culpable under
traditional excuse theories akin to duress. Assessing women's culpa-
bility, however, requires a more thorough and subtle analysis of the
61 The American wage labor system, which is structured as if workers have no child care
responsibilities, imposes an analogous form of gender inequality. See MaryJoe Frug, Secur-
ingjob Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55, 56-61
(1979);Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MicH. L. REv. 797, 822 (1989). Accord-
ing to Joan Williams, this assumption systematically disadvantages working women who
become economically marginalized in order to allow their husbands to perform as ideal
workers and to ensure that their children receive high-quality care. Williams, supra, at 823.
62 Nagel &Johnson, supra note 4, at 204-05. Poor and minority defendants were disad-
vantaged by mitigations for ties in the community not because they had no community ties,
but because their ties did not fit within the norm of middle-class social networks.
63 Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 15, at 106.
64 Nagel &Johnson, supra note 4, at 213-15.
65 Id.
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gendered circumstances that lead to women's offending. Scholars
may want to reexamine traditional notions of duress to construct a
theory of culpability that better accounts for the moral accountability
of women who are bound to criminal men. They should also examine
more closely the significance of women's relationships to men in
courts' reasoning about female culpability. Do judges apply theories
of complicity in gendered ways that disadvantage women? In some
cases, it appears that courts base women's responsibility for crime at
least partly on the women's role as the wife or girlfriend of the more
culpable men. The question becomes not whether women should be
excused because of their relationship with criminal men, but whether
they are sometimes blamed for their relationship with criminal men.
The significance of women's role as intimate partner, as well as
mother, in defining women's criminality is an important area for fur-
ther feminist inquiry.
The meaning of gender equality in criminal law is contested even
among feminists. It is impossible to define a grand feminist theory
that will produce an egalitarian criminal justice system. Here are,
however, three broad guidelines for a feminist analysis of criminal law:
it should center on the political nature of both the commission and
definition of crime; it should search beyond the appearance of pref-
erential treatment to reveal deeper biases in the law; and it should
account for the interplay of race and class, along with gender, in the
criminal law's treatment of women. Ultimately, this critique of crimi-
nal law's patriarchal components should yield a feminist vision of
criminal justice that questions the traditional notions of harm, culpa-
bility, and punishment that are so readily accepted.
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